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Fashioning Worker Protections
to Combat the Thin Ideal's Cost on
Fashion Models and Public Health
ABSTRACT

Studies linking thin-obsessed media consumption to poor health
outcomes for women have permeated the medical literature for years.
The pressures female fashion models face to sacrifice their health for
their jobs are perhaps even more disturbing. These harrowing issues
are symptoms of the "thin ideal," the social norm glorifying a female
body type so thin it is unattainablefor most women. Despite the clear
harm imposed by the thin ideal, the United States has done little to
combat its effect on the working conditions of fashion models and on
public health more generally. This Note suggests that the US fashion
industry currently lacks incentives to change its practicesfor the better.
Thus, the United States should follow the lead of other major players
in the internationalfashion industry and should incentivize its fashion
industry members to avoid practices that result in extremely thin
models.
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esteem."

Caption for a single piece of spinach on a plate: "Girls lunch after watching
#VSfashionshow"

-@STASHLIT 2
"5 minutes into the [Victoria's Secret] fashion show and I already wanna kill

myself."
-@happylarry 3

Every year, the Victoria's Secret fashion show inspires a flurry
of alarming social media reactions ranging from complaints about
self-esteem to jokes about anorexia and suicide. 4 This commentary
reflects a pervasive and circular public health issue in our society
known as the "thin ideal."5
The thin ideal is the socially constructed concept of an ideal
female body so thin that it is unattainable for most women.6 This

1.
Girl
Code
(@GirlCodeAPage),
TWITTER
(Sept.
27,
2017,
1:03 PM),
https://twitter.com/GirlCodeAPage/status/913131884036714496 [https://perma.cc/W4WP-PPFZ].
2.
STASH
(@STASHLIT),
TWITTER
(Dec.
10,
2013,
10:16
PM),
https://twitter.com/STASHLIT/status/410654368107470848 [https://perma.cc/UW2P-3V7F].
3.
#1
Sam Kerr Stan (@happylarry), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2015, 7:05 PM),
https://twitter.com/happylarry/status/674424583261409280 [https://perma.cc/D4XM-3DK9].
4.
See, e.g., #1 Sam Kerr Stan, supra note 3; Girl Code, supra note 1; STASH, supra
note 2.
5.
See Shelly Grabe, L. Monique Ward & Janet Shibley Hyde, The Role of the Media in
Body Image Concerns Among Women: A Meta-Analysis of Experimental and Correlational
Studies, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 460, 460 (2008).
6.
J. Kevin Thompson & Eric Stice, Thin-Ideal Internalization:Mounting Evidence for
a New Risk Factor for Body-Image Disturbance and Eating Pathology, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 181, 181 (2001).
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ideal imposes a variety of physical and mental health costs across
members of our society. 7 Harms imposed by the thin ideal primarily
include body dissatisfaction, negative moods, low self-esteem,
8
depression, eating disorder symptoms, and suicide.
Much of the academic literature on the thin ideal focuses on
9
the harm experienced through a process termed "internalization."
Internalization occurs when an individual experiences the thin ideal
as a social norm and, in turn, "cognitively 'buys into' socially defined
ideals of attractiveness and engages in behaviors designed to produce
an approximation of these ideals."1 0 In cases of internalization, the
drive to be thin is ingrained in the individual herself."
However, the thin ideal can also have a harmful impact via
external pressures. 12 In such a scenario, an outside party pressures
13
Scholars note
an individual to lose weight or change her body shape.
common examples of this type of pressure in employer-employee
relationships, particularly in industries in which the pressured
1
employee is visible to clients, customers, or consumers. 4 While
existing laws protect employees from many types of employer

&

7.
See id.
See Mandy McCarthy, The Thin Ideal, Depression and Eating Disorders in Women,
8.
28 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 205, 205 (1990); Teresa Rodriguez-Cano, Luis Beato-Ferndndez
Antonia Belmonte Llario, Body Dissatisfactionas a Predictor of Self-Reported Suicide Attempts
in Adolescents: A Spanish Community Prospective Study, 38 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 684, 687
(2006); Eric Stice & Heather E. Shaw, Adverse Effects of the Media Portrayed Thin-Ideal on
Women and Linkages to Bulimic Symptomatology, 13 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 288, 288
(1994).
See, e.g., Helga Dittmar & Sarah Howard, Thin-Ideal Internalization and Social
9.
ComparisonTendency as Moderatorsof Media Models' Impact on Women's Body-Focused Anxiety,
23 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 768, 770 (2004); Thompson & Stice, supranote 6, at 181.
See Thompson & Stice, supra note 6, at 181 (citing J. KEVIN THOMPSON ET AL.,
10.
EXACTING BEAUTY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT OF BODY IMAGE. DISTURBANCE

(1999)).
Id.
11.
Priya Elan, 'My Agents Told Me to Stop Eating'-The Reality of Body Image in
12.
Modelling, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2016, 12:24 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2016/
apr/07/my-agents-told-me-to-stop-eating-the-reality-of-body-image-in-modelling
[https://perma.cc/AT7T-EEYX?type=image].
See id.
13.
14.

See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN

LIFE AND LAW 98 (2010); Janet L. Treasure, Elizabeth R. Wack & Marion E. Roberts, Models as a
High-Risk Group: The Health Implications of a Size Zero Culture, 192 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 243,
244 (2008); see also Elan, supra note 12; The Financial Confessions, The Financial Confessions:
"My Boss Told Me to Lose Weight If I Wanted a Promotion", FIN. DIET (Aug. 9, 2016),
http://thefinancialdiet.com/financial-confessions-boss-told-lose-weight-wanted-promotion/
[https://perma.cclM3BU-GQPD].
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discrimination, 15
minimal protection exists for weight-based
discrimination. 16
This Note specifically focuses on the negative impacts of the
thin ideal caused by external pressures placed on fashion models.
Fashion agencies and designers require the majority of models to
maintain an incredibly thin physique, which often leads to eating
disorders and has even led to multiple deaths in the industry.1 7
However, the negative health impact on the models themselves is not
the only reason that fashion industry pressures are an important
issue. By requiring models to be incredibly thin, the fashion industry
continues to contribute to the internalization of the thin ideal among
the general public.18
Thus, there is a two-fold argument for protecting models from
industry demands of extreme thinness. Protection for models from
pressures to maintain an incredibly thin body type can advance the
rights and well-being of the models themselves while also tackling a
pervasive public health issue.
This Note addresses the current state of the fashion industry
and the physical and mental harm it imposes on models, the resulting
secondary harms on public health, the potential protections and
remedies available to models, and an analysis of the most effective of
the available options. Part I describes the effect of the thin ideal on
fashion models and the general public in detail by presenting scientific
studies that provide evidence of the frequency and severity of body
image-related health issues. Part II explores recent developments in
the fashion industry-including high-profile deaths of models from
anorexia-and different progressive responses to these occurrences
among the international fashion community.
Part III analyzes
existing worker protections in the United States and highlights
features of each that are relevant to their ability to protect fashion
models.
Part IV examines the feasibility of implementing these
worker protections for fashion models, suggests that legislation is the
most promising of these options,
and discusses potential
characteristics of an ideal legislative response.

15.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
16.
RHODE, supra note 14, at 118; Elizabeth Kristen, Comment, Addressing the Problem
of Weight Discriminationin Employment, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 57, 60 (2002).
17.
See Elan, supra note 12; see also Kimberly Conniff Taber, With Model's Death,
Eating Disorders Are
Again
in
Spotlight,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
20,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/20/world/americas/20iht-models.3604439.html
[https://perma.c/5VXV-7GAL].
18.
See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
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I. THE THIN IDEAL'S COST

This Note begins by addressing the types and extent of harms
caused by the thin ideal and identifying the parties most affected by
the thin ideal. Understanding these harms is necessary in order to
accurately estimate the benefits that protecting models could provide.
A. Types of Harm Caused by the Thin Ideal
Harm from the thin ideal manifests itself through a variety of
outcomes, many of which the American Psychological Association
The Diagnostic and
(APA) categorizes as eating disorders.1 9
defines eight
(the
"DSM-5")
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
categories of eating disorders, only four of which are pertinent to those
attempting to lose weight 20: anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, other
specified eating or feeding disorders, and unspecified eating, or feeding
disorders.
The DSM-5 defines anorexia nervosa (anorexia) through the
following symptoms: (i) restriction of energy intake, which leads to a
"significantly low body weight" after accounting for age, sex,
developmental trajectory, and physical health; (ii) an intense fear of
weight gain or persistent behavior designed to avoid weight gain; and
(iii) a disturbance in body perception, excessive influence placed on
body shape and weight in self-evaluation, or a persistent failure to
perceive the seriousness of the current low body weight. 21
Bulimia nervosa (bulimia) shares many DSM-5 symptoms with
anorexia, including similar body perception and self-evaluation
distortions. In contrast to anorexia, the defining characteristic of
bulimia is binge eating combined with compensatory behaviors such
as self-induced vomiting, a misuse of laxatives or similar medications,
fasting, or excessive exercising. 22
The DSM-5 characterizes other specified feeding or eating
disorders (OSFEDs) as "presentations in which symptoms
characteristic of a feeding and eating disorder that cause clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning predominate but do not meet the full

19.

See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS 329-54 (5th ed. 2013).
See id. The four remaining disorders-binge eating disorder, pica, rumination
20.
disorder, and avoidance/restrictive food intake disorder-are considered unrelated to
attempted weight loss for this Note's purposes.
21.
Id. at 338-39.
See id. at 345.
22.
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criteria for any of the disorders in the feeding and eating disorders
diagnostic class." 2 3

Unspecified feeding and eating disorders (UFEDs) are similar
to OSFEDs but occur in situations in which the "clinician chooses not
to specify the reason that the criteria are not met for a specific feeding
and eating disorder, and includes presentations in which there is
insufficient information to make a more specific diagnosis." 24
In addition, the thin ideal causes harmful outcomes outside of
eating disorders. An individual can experience unhealthy weight
control behaviors (UWCBs) without being diagnosed with a full-blown
eating disorder. 25 Further, studies link the thin ideal to general
negative body image and depression. 26 Throughout the remainder of
this Note, the term "eating disorders" describes the four diseases
mentioned above as defined by the DSM-5. The Note uses the term
"UWCBs" to describe any form of unhealthy weight control, including
eating disorders as well as conditions that fall short of an eating
disorder diagnosis, such as unhealthy dieting habits and substance
use to control weight.
Experts estimate that 0.9 percent and 1.5 percent of US women
experience anorexia and bulimia, respectively, within their lifetime. 2 7
Eating disorders are especially common for young women, with
anorexia being the third most common chronic illness among
adolescents. 28 For instance, 2.7 percent of adolescents suffer from an
eating disorder, with female adolescents being twice as likely as their
male peers to suffer from an eating disorder. 29 Some studies find an
even higher prevalence of UWCBs, ranging upwards of 30 percent
among adolescents. 30

23.
Id. at 353.
24.
Id. at 354.
25.
See Margaret Grigg, Jenny Bowman & Sally Redman, Disordered Eating and
Unhealthy Weight Reduction PracticesAmong Adolescent Females, 25 PREVENTIVE MED. 748, 749
(1996).
26.
See McCarthy, supra note 8, at 205.
27.
See James I. Hudson et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Eating Disordersin the
National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 61 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 348, 350 tbl.1 (2007).
28.
Sara Kakhi & Jacinta McCann, Anorexia Nervosa: Diagnosis, Risk Factors and
Evidence-Based

Treatments,

PROGRESS

NEUROLOGY

&

PSYCHIATRY

(Dec.

1,

2016),

http://www.progressnp.com/article/anorexia-nervosa-diagnosis-risk-factors-evidence-basedtreatments/ [https://perma.cc/54TC-Q5NX].
29.

Eating Disorders,

NAT'L

INST.

MENTAL

HEALTH,

https://www.nimh.nih.gov/

health/statistics/eating-disorders.shtml#part 155062 [https://perma.cc/G7VF-ZWAA] (last visited
Mar. 9, 2018).
30.
See Grigg, Bowman & Redman, supra note 25, at 751 (reporting that 36 percent of
adolescents surveyed had engaged in an "extreme" form of dieting within the past month).
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Anorexia has the highest mortality rate of any mental disorder,
with estimated mortality rates ranging between 10 and 20 percent for
diagnosed individuals. 31 Equally as alarming is the fact that the
suicide rate for women suffering from anorexia is estimated to be up to
fifty-seven times higher than that of the female general population of
the same age. 32 While anorexia is clearly associated with negative
health outcomes for the female population as a whole, it is especially
harmful to young female adolescents. 33 A 1995 meta-analysiS 34 of
adolescent mortality found alarming outcomes for girls ages fifteen to
twenty-four who suffer from anorexia. For these girls, the mortality
rate associated with anorexia is twelve times higher than the
mortality rate from all other causes of death combined, with a suicide
rate two hundred times higher than the general population. 35
Less severe UWCBs cause health consequences as well. For
instance, yo-yo dieting-a phenomenon describing cyclical weightloss
and gain, which is common to dieters-is linked to clogged arteries,
loss of bone density, and congestive heart failure, with over fifteen
studies associating yo-yo dieting with increased mortality. 36
Obsession with the thin ideal can further lead to unhealthy decisions.
For instance, some women begin smoking to suppress their appetite in
order to lose weight. 37 Others refuse to quit smoking for fear of weight
gain. One study found that three-quarters of female smokers are
unwilling to put on more than five pounds as a result of quitting,
while almost half would not accept any weight increase. 38 Thus, a
drive to be thin both creates female smokers and prevents them from

31.

RHODE, supra note 14, at 40.

32.
Id.
33.
Patrick F. Sullivan, Mortality in Anorexia Nervosa, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1073,
1074 (1995).
A meta-analysis is a research method that systematically combines data from
34.
previously published studies in order to develop a conclusion with greater statistical power than
any single study. Study Design 101, GEO. WASH. U., https://himmelfarb.gwu.edu/tutorials/
studydesignl0l/metaanalyses.html [https://perma.cc/5KLU-CZ4R] (last updated Nov. 2011).
Sullivan, supra note 33, at 1074.
35.
RHODE, supra note 14, at 40-41; see also Kelly D. Brownell & Judith Rodin, Medical,
36.
Metabolic, and Psychological Effects of Weight Cycling, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1325, 1329
(1994).
Simone A. French et al., Weight Concerns, Dieting Behavior, and Smoking Initiation
37.
Among Adolescents: A ProspectiveStudy, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1818, 1820 (1994) ("[A]dolescent
girls who diet or who are concerned about their weight initiate smoking at higher rates than
nondieters or those with fewer weight concerns."); Robert C. Klesges & Lisa M. Klesges,
Cigarette Smoking as a Dieting Strategy in a University Population, 7 INT'L J. EATING DISORDERS

413, 416 (1988) (finding that 39 percent of female smokers studied used smoking as a weight loss
strategy).
RHODE, supranote 14, at 40.
38.
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quitting, increasing their risk of lung cancer and other negative
smoking-related health outcomes. 39
B. PartiesAffected by the Thin Ideal
This Note models the dissemination of the thin ideal as follows:
Figure 1.

Fashion
Models

External Pressures

Internalization

ra
.bi

AgenciesGe
and
Designers
Market
Demand

39.

See

Health Effects

of Cigarette Smoking,

CTRS.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

&

Pressures placed on fashion models to maintain an unhealthily
low body weight have a two-fold impact.
First, these pressures
directly impact the models' health. A recent survey of fashion models
found that 62 percent of survey respondents were asked by their
agencies to lose weight within the past year. 40 This result is especially
alarming given that the median body mass index (BMI) of the survey
respondents was 17.41, with 81 percent of respondents classified as
underweight according to standards set by the World Health
Organization (WHO).4 1 Most importantly, the study found a high

PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/fact-sheets/healtheffects/
effects cig-smoking/index.htm [https://perma.cc/ZZ78-9F5Z] (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
40.
Rachel F. Rodgers et al., Results of a Strategic Science Study to Inform Policies
Targeting Extreme Thinness Standards in the Fashion Industry, 50 INT'L J. EATING DISORDERS

284, 287 (2017).
41.

Id.

at

286-87;

Body

Mass

Index-BMI,

WORLD

HEALTH

ORG.,

http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/disease-prevention/nutrition/a-healthy-lifestylebody-

1227

FASHIONING WORKER PROTECTIONS

2018]

correlation between being asked to lose weight by an agency and
engaging in UWCBs. 42 The study elicits the conclusion that the thin
ideal creates direct pressure on fashion models to obtain or maintain
an unhealthily low body weight. One can also infer that in order to
achieve these goals, models take extreme measures that exact a toll on
their bodies and their mental health.
Second, pressures placed on fashion models to be thin impact
the image of the ideal female body presented to consumers. This can
cause internalization of the thin ideal and negative health outcomes
for consumers beyond the fashion industry itself. Below, Parts I.B.1
and I.B.2 discuss in detail the thin ideal's primary impact on fashion
models and secondary impact on consumers.
1. Primary Effects: The Models Themselves
Some models may possess the ability to achieve the extreme
body weight required by their agencies through a mixture of genetics,
healthy diet, and exercise. This group of individuals likely bears few
to none of the costs of the thin ideal. However, there is evidence that
many turn to eating disorders, unhealthy dieting habits, or substance
use to lose weight, all of which have a negative impact on an
individual's physical and mental health. 43
While well-established anecdotal evidence suggests that
UWCBs run rampant within the fashion industry, 44 the first
large-scale empirical study to examine this phenomenon was not
The study was a collaboration
published until January 2017.45
46
between researchers from two universities and the Model Alliance, a
The
group that engages in advocacy for models' well-being. 47
researchers designed and administered a survey that included

mass-index-bmi [https://perma.cc/R2MC-S7VF] (last visited Mar. 9, 2018) (defining those with a
BMI below 18.5 as underweight).
See Rodgers et al., supra note 40, at 287-88.
42.
See id.; see also Sara Ziff, How Eating Disordersin the FashionIndustry Are a Labor
43.
Issue, MODEL ALLIANCE, http://modelalliance.org/2017/how-eating-disorders-in-the-fashion9, 2018)
(last visited Mar.
[https://perma.cc/HG7B-3HTH]
industry-are-a-labor-issue
(interviewing two former models about their struggles with eating disorders while working in the
fashion industry).
See, e.g., Elan, supra note 12.
44.
45.

See

Rodgers

et

al.,

supra

note

40,

at

284;

Reports,

MODEL

ALLIANCE,

http://modelaliance.org/industry-analysis [https://perma.cc/KU8H-BDYF] (last visited Mar. 9,
2018).
Reports, supranote 45.
46.
See Mission, MODEL ALLIANCE, http://modelalliance.org/mission [https://perma.cc/
47.
9C79-Z9C8] (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
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subjects aged eighteen or older who walked in New York Fashion
Week (NYFW). 48
The researchers designed this collaborative study with three
goals in mind. First, the study aimed to determine rates of UWCBs
among models. 49 Next, it sought to determine whether there was a
correlation between UWCBs and pressures from models' agencies to
lose weight.5 0 Finally, the survey asked models about the perceived
feasibility and effectiveness of different potential policy measures
designed to protect them. These measures are discussed in Part IV.51
The study covered a range of weight and shape control
methods, asking models about whether they engaged in behaviors
such as "skipping meals (56%), dieting (71%), fasts/cleanses/detoxes
(52%), using weight-loss supplements or diet pills (23%), self-induced
vomiting (8%), and using stimulants such as Ritalin (16%) or cocaine
(7%), or using intravenous drips (2%)."52 Importantly, DSM-5 does not
necessarily classify any of these behaviors alone as eating disorders,
nor does dieting singlehandedly reflect a UWCB; rather, some of these
behaviors could be a reflection of a healthy method of weight control.
However, given that 81 percent of these models are underweight by
WHO standards,5 3 it would be difficult to consider any behavior meant
to further decrease body weight among this population a healthy
method of weight control.
From a policy perspective, perhaps the most significant finding
of this study was a high correlation between those subjects asked to
lose weight by an agency and those engaging in weight- or
shape-controlling behaviors. 54 Of all the behaviors listed above, the
study showed that only self-induced vomiting and use of intravenous
drips failed to correlate with pressure from an agency to lose weight.55

48.
Rodgers et al., supra note 40, at 285. NYFW is a twice-yearly event during which
fashion designers showcase their collections for the upcoming season. Fawnia Soo Hoo, Fashion
Week 101: What It Is and Why It Matters, TEEN VOGUE (Feb. 13, 2015, 8:00 AM),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-is-fashion-week

[https://perma.cc/7FK2-SXQK].

Many

models dream of and strive to walk in this prestigious event. How to Become a Model for New
York
Fashion
Week,
LATITUDE
TALENT
STUDIOS
(May
12,
2017),
https://www.latitudetalent.com/single-post/become-a-Model-for-New-York-Fashion-Week
[https://perma.cc/CNJ7-RHNP].
49.
Rodgers et al., supra note 40, at 289.
50.
Id.
51.
See id. at 290.
52.
Id. at 287.
53.
Id. at 289; see Body Mass Index-BMI, supra note 41.
54.
See Rodgers et al., supra note 40, at 287-88.
55.
See id.
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2. Secondary Effects: The Public Health Impact
The secondary impact of the thin ideal manifests itself through
the general public's internalization of the thin ideal. Importantly,
only part of the causation of eating disorders may be attributed to the
thin ideal, as there is strong evidence that genetics are a risk factor
for developing many forms of eating disorders. 56 However, a number
of studies show internalization of the thin ideal as a strong predictor
of eating disorders and UWCBs generally. Thus, while diminishing
the dissemination of the thin ideal will not eliminate all UWCBs, it
will almost certainly have a positive impact.
Researchers use a variety of methods to show the causal link
between thin-obsessed culture and problematic health outcomes.5 7
One study provides the most intuitive example of this link.58 In 1995,
a rural community in Western Fiji acquired television access, exposing
those in the community to the thin-obsessed Western media for the
first time. 59 Researchers conducted surveys of adolescent girls in the
community both immediately after the introduction of television, in
1995, and then again three years later, in 1998.60 The surveys
consisted of a modified twenty-six-item eating attitudes test (the
"EAT-26"), 61 questions about television viewing, and measurements of
height and weight. 62 The 1998 survey included additional narrative
responses.63
These narrative responses provide insight into the minds of
these adolescent girls. One survey participant stated:

Allie Bidwell, Researchers Find Genes Linked to High Risk of Eating Disorders, U.S.
56.
NEWS, (Oct. 8, 2013, 5:31 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/08/researchersfind-genes-linked-to-high-risk-of-eating-disorders [https://perma.cc/NEL9-76XR].
See, e.g., Amy L. Ahern, Kate M. Bennett & Marion M. Hetherington, Internalization
57.
of the Ultra-Thin Ideal: Positive Implicit Associations with Underweight Fashion Models Are
Associated with Drive for Thinness in Young Women, 16 EATING DISORDERS 294, 297-301 (2008);
Dittmar & Howard, supra note 9, at 769-70; Grabe, Ward & Hyde, supra note 5, at 463-69;
Thompson & Stice, supranote 6, at 181.
See Anne E. Becker et al., Eating Behaviours and Attitudes Following Prolonged
58.
Exposure to Television Among Ethnic Fijian Adolescent Girls, 180 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 509, 509
(2002).
Id.
59.
60.
Id.
The EAT-26 is a "standardized self-report measure of symptoms and concerns
61.
characteristic of eating disorders." Eating Attitudes Test, EAT-26, https://www.eat-26.com
[https://perma.cc/ARB9-MMRP] (last visited Mar. 10, 2018). Individuals with a score of 20 or
more on the EAT-26 should be referred to a mental health professional for a diagnostic
evaluation. Id.

62.
63.

Becker et al., supra note 58, at 509-10.
Id. at 510.
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When I look at the characters on TV, the way they act on TV and I just look at the
body, the figure of that body, so I say, "look at them, they are thin and they all
64
have this figure", so I myself want to become like that, to become thin.

With respect to empirical results, the researchers found two
significant between-sample differences. In 1995, immediately after
television was introduced, 0 percent of survey respondents reported
engaging in self-induced vomiting. 65 This percentage rose to 11.3
percent in the 1998 wave of the survey. 66 Further, the proportion of
girls who scored above twenty on the EAT-26-considered a high
score-rose from 12.7 percent in 1995 to 29.2 percent in 1998.67
Finally, the second wave of the survey found that respondents
who lived in a household with a television were three times more
likely to score higher than twenty on EAT-26 than those who did not
have a household television.6 8 This study's findings, among countless
others, provide evidence causally linking exposure to Western media
and thin-obsessed cultural norms with UWCBs and negative body
image. 69
II. FASHION MODELS AND THE THIN IDEAL: A BRIEF HISTORY

Conversations about the negative impact of the thin ideal
began to circulate among academics in the early 1990s. 70 However,
the thin ideal and fashion models' well-being became a hot-button
issue in the mainstream media in 2006, when two fashion models
succumbed to anorexia within a three-month period.7 1 Luisel Ramos,
an Uruguayan fashion model, died of anorexia-related heart failure
during a runway show in August 2006.72 Ana Carolina Reston, a
twenty-one-year-old Brazilian model, died three months later of
anorexia complications. 73 The close proximity and clear causation of
these two deaths sparked a public outcry. 74 Bringing further attention
64.
Id. at 513.
65.
Id. at 510 & tbl.1.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
68.
Id. at 511.
69.
See id. at 510.
70.
See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 8, at 205.
71.
Taber, supra note 17.
72.
Martin Beckford, Sister of Tragic 'Size Zero' Model Found Dead, TELEGRAPH (Feb.
15, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1542707/Sister-of-tragic-size-zeromodel-found-dead.html [https://perma.cc/PFS2-7K8T].
73.
See Taber, supra note 17.
74.
Id.; see Raul Garces, 2 Uruguayan Sisters, Both Models, Die, WASH. POST (Feb. 14,
2007,
9:03
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/14/
AR2007021401624.html [https://perma.cclLG3Z-QV9U].
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to the issue was the 2007 death of Luisel's sister Eliana, who worked
as a fashion model and also passed away from suspected
malnutrition.7 5
A number of players in the international fashion community
reacted swiftly to these high-profile deaths. The Spanish and Italian
governments prompted industry change without passing a formal law
on the matter. Under pressure from the Spanish government, the
Association of Fashion Designers of Spain banned models with a BMI
below eighteen from walking in Madrid's fashion week. 76 Soon after,
the city government of Milan and Milan's fashion industry reached an
agreement that banned models under the age of sixteen and those
with a BMI under 18.5 from walking during its fashion week.7 7
Another high-profile model death in 2010 brought eating
disorders back into the public eye when Isabelle Caro, a former model
78
who began an anorexia awareness campaign, died from her illness.

Since Caro's death, two countries passed formal laws designed
to combat the thin ideal and protect fashion models from weight loss
pressures. 79 Israel was the first country to take action, passing a law
in 2012 that bans fashion agencies from employing models with a BMI
The law also requires advertisers to mark
lower than 18.5.80
advertisements in which they used Photoshop to distort models' body
shapes or sizes.8 1 France passed a similar law in 2016, with one major
difference: instead of requiring a minimum BMI, France requires
models to provide a doctor's certificate stating that the model is a
healthy weight, accounting for the model's size, shape, and age. 8 2
Similar to Israel's Photoshop-disclaimer requirement, France
mandated that any image where Photoshop or similar technology

Beckford, supranote 72.
75.
Aimee Liu, Madrid Throws Models a Curve, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2006),
76.
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/22/opinion/oe-liu22 [https://perma.cc/BRF5-EW9Z].
77.
Milan Bans Ultra-Skinny Models from Catwalk, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2007, 6:23 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-fashion-anorexia/milan-bans-ultra-skinny-models-from-

/

catwalk-idUSL1924991520061219 [https://perma.cc/SL52-VWD3].
France Likely to Pass Bill Banning Super-Skinny Models, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar.
78.
16, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/fashion/france-pass-bill-banningsuper-skinny-models-article- 1.2151142 [https://perma.cc/AVN3-47ZV].
Id.
79.
See Talya Minsberg, What the U.S. Can-and Can't-Learn from Israel's Ban on
80.
Ultra-Thin Models, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
91
2
2012/05/what-the-us-can-and-cant-learn-from-israels-ban-on-ultra-thin-models/ 568
[https://perma.cc/473P-YBJK].
Id.
81.
(May
Models, BBC
Thin
France Bans Extremely
82.
See
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39821036 [https://perma.cc/HV33-3GKP].
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alters a model's body must receive a label designating the image a
retouched photograph. 83
Despite the clear danger to models, reactions from other
countries, and studies demonstrating that media portrayals of
extremely thin women increase an array of poor public health
outcomes, the response within the United States has been strikingly
limited. The only action taken in the wake of these events was a set of
voluntary guidelines published by the Council of Fashion Designers of
America (CFDA), known as the CFDA Health Initiative. 84 The CFDA
is a nonprofit trade association consisting of more than five hundred
US fashion designers.8 5
The CFDA's guidelines serve as an
"underwhelming" response to the problem of underweight models. 86
Given the outcomes of the survey of models discussed above, it seems
apparent that these voluntary guidelines are ineffective. The time for
the United States to assess its options and pursue another course of
action in order to protect its models and its impressionable
adolescents is now.
III. EXISTING WORKER PROTECTIONS

Workers' welfare is an important topic, particularly given the
amount of time Americans spend working. Indeed, for the population
aged twenty-five to fifty-four, Americans spend more time on
work-related activities than on any other activity-except "personal
care," which includes sleeping.8 7 The United States generally values
the well-being of its workers, as evidenced by laws designed to protect
83.

Vanessa Friedman, A New Age in French-Modeling, N.Y. Times (May 8, 2017),

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/fashion/france-laws-thin-models.html

[https://perma.cc/J2CH-SPME].
84.
Samantha Critchell, Guidelines Target Thin Models, OKLAHOMAN (Jan. 21, 2007,
12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/3000996 [https://perma.cc/7HRG-RUS8].
85.
About CFDA, COUNCIL FASHION DESIGNERS AM., https://cfda.com/about-cfda
[https://perma.cc/HK4S-BYWJ] (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).
86.
Cassandra A. Soltis, Dying to Be a Supermodel: Can Requiring a Healthy BMI Be
Fashionable?, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 49, 50 (2009). Of the last four annual reports
from the CFDA, only three mention the CFDA Health Initiative. See CFDA, ANNUAL REPORT
2013, at 42 (2014); CFDA, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 32 (2015); CFDA, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 52
(2017); see also CFDA, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2016) (making no mention of the CFDA Health
Initiative). Of the three annual reports that do discuss the CFDA Health Initiative, none directly
discuss efforts to curb disordered eating among models or attempts to generally reduce pressure
to be thin within the industry. See CFDA, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra, at 42; CFDA, ANNUAL
REPORT 2014, supra, at 32; CFDA, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra, at 52.
87.
See Average Hours Per Day Spent in Selected Activities by Age, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/charts/american-time-use/activity-by-age.htm [https://perma.cc/429P-BQNB]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (select the age ranges "25 to 34 years" and "45 to 54 years" in
addition to the default selections).
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workers 8 8 and by the government entities tasked with promoting their
welfare. 89 For instance, the Department of Labor seeks to "foster,
promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners, job seekers, and
retirees of the United States; improve working conditions; advance
opportunities for profitable employment; and assure work-related
benefits and rights."9 0
The goal of worker protections is not to eliminate all health and
safety risks in the workplace. 9 1 Not only is it impossible to eliminate
This concept is best
all risks, but it is undesirable to do so. 9 2
Consider the risks presented by
illustrated through an analogy.
traveling in an automobile. This is a fairly risky activity, with the
average lifetime risk of death by car accident for the US population
We could eliminate this risk by outlawing
equal to 1:645.93
automobiles or greatly diminish the risk by reducing the speed limit to
ten miles per hour. However, we value the convenience that cars'.
94
provide and are willing to accept the trade-off of risk for accessibility.
The same concept applies to worker safety. Willingness to pay
for a product creates a market for that product, which in turn requires
workers to produce it. It may be impossible or incredibly costly to
eliminate risks for workers in certain jobs. 95 Thus, workers must
determine what level of risks they are willing to accept for a certain
wage. 96 Within this framework, we want to incentivize employers to
provide an efficiently safe work environment and encourage employees
to take efficient levels of precaution. 97
Unfortunately, the current health risks that fashion models
face in the course of their employment are undesirable from both
The thin ideal creates
economic and values-based standpoints.

88.
See Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor, U.S. DEP'T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/majorlaws [https://perma.cc/4RD3-V5HC] (last visited Mar.
10, 2018).
See, e.g., Our Mission, U.S. DEP'T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/generallaboutdollmission
89.
[https://perma.cclY3EX-UW4E] (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).
Id.
90.
Thomas A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory Mismatch in the Workplace: An
91.
InformationalApproach to Workplace Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1014 (2004).
92.

W. KIP Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND

SAFETY

IN THE

WORKPLACE 3 (1983).
Facts + Statistics: Mortality Risk, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact93.
statistic/facts-statistics-mortality-risk [https://perma.cc/NYB2-XRKB] (last visited Mar. 10,
2018).
See VISCUSI, supra note 92, at 37.
94.
See id. at 3.
95.
See id. at 38.
96.
See id. at 4.
97.
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negative externalities; 9 8 not only are fashion models suffering health
consequences from pressures to be thin, but the end product of their
labor is generally harmful to the public that consumes it.99 Further,
extreme bargaining power disparities within the fashion industry
have created a situation in which models feel they must either risk
their health or lose their job. 100 Given the current indefensible level of
health risk in the fashion industry, this Note next attempts to
determine what form of intervention is appropriate.
Economists John Leeth and Nathan Hale provide a helpful
description of systems that act to enhance workers' welfare. 101 They
describe four separate pillars that provide protection to US workers:
the labor market, workers' compensation, the legal system, and
regulation
through
the
Occupational
Safety
and
Health
102
Administration (OSHA).
This Part provides background on each
pillar, with a specific focus on elements that are relevant to each's
ability to function as protection for fashion models.
One concept that reverberates throughout three of the four
pillars is the concept of employee versus independent contractor
classification. 1 0 3
In the case of the legal system, workers'
compensation, and OSHA regulation, classification as an independent
contractor often acts as an insurmountable hurdle to obtaining
workplace protections. 104
The fashion industry currently classifies its models as
independent contractors.1 0 5 This practice stems from the triangular
relationship between fashion models, their agencies, and clients who
purchase the models' services. 106 Clients purchase fashion models'
services through the models' agencies without any sort of direct

98.

See discussion infra Part III.A.

99.
100.

See supra Part I.
See infra Part IV.A-B.

101.
JOHN LEETH & NATHAN HALE, MERCATUS CTR.
EVALUATING
OSHA's
EFFECTIVENESS
AND
SUGGESTIONS

AT GEORGE
FOR

MASON UNIV.,
REFORM
2
(2013),

https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/HaleOSHAMOP_041913.pdf#page=4
[https://perma.cc/8S3S-56AH].
102.
Id. at 1.
103.
See infra Part III.B-D.
104.
See infra Part III.B-D; see also Ariel Sodomsky, Note, Models of Confusion: Strutting
the Line Between Agent and Manager, Employee and Independent Contractor in the New York
Modeling Industry, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269, 294 (2014).
105.
Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, Runway Injustice: The Outrageous Cost of Being a
Model, CNN MONEY (May 12, 2016, 10:15 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/09/news/runwayinjustice-model-expenses/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8DE-6REB].
106.
See Sodomsky, supra note 104, at 289-90.
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This setup creates a classic
contract with the model.107
diffusion-of-responsibility problem and a workers' rights nightmare.
Neither modeling agencies nor their clients are willing to claim models
as their employees due to the tax costs, legal implications, and other
monetary consequences.

08

Due to the potential hurdles created by the structure of fashion
models' employment relationships, this Part additionally advances a
fifth pillar of worker protection: innovative lawmaking.
A. The Labor Market
The private labor market is the first line of defense against
unsafe workplaces and practices that are detrimental to workers'
Economic theory and empirical studies suggest that
well-being.
workers bargain with potential employers for a safe workplace and
demand higher wages in order to accept workplace risks. 109 Thus,
employers face a trade-off between investing in workplace safety and
offering higher wages, providing an incentive for employers to
diminish workplace hazards. However, in some scenarios, the labor
market produces undesirable outcomes for workers. 110 Two instances
of such scenarios include negative externalities and bargaining power
disparities, which are particularly applicable to the current state of
the fashion industry.111

Negative externalities occur when a third party is harmed due
to a transaction to which she is not a party. 112 A simple example of a
negative externality is noise pollution. Friends enjoying a party may
disturb their neighbor. If the partygoers are not held accountable for

Vanessa Friedman, After Weinstein Scandal, a Plan to Protect Models, N.Y. TIMES
107.
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/fashion/sexual-harassment-law-modelsnew-york-state-harvey-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc/GF6Y-G6C4].
See Sodomsky, supra note 104, at 290.
108.
See Konstantinos Pouliakas & Ioannis Theodossiou, The Economics of Health and
109.
Safety at Work: An Interdisciplinary Review of the Theory and Policy, 27 J. ECON. SURvs. 167,
179 (2013); W. Kip Viscusi, Wealth Effects and Earnings Premiums for Job Hazards, 60 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 408, 408 (1978).
See Stewart J. Schwab, Law-and-Economics Approaches to Labour and Employment
110.
Law, 33 INT'L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 115, 135-39 (2017).
Id. Other forces-such as asymmetric information-may lead to undesirably unsafe
111.
workplaces as well, but are not discussed due to lack of relevance in the fashion industry. Id. at
137.
ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC
112.
THEORY 352 n.2 (1995); see, e.g., Abbey Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriageof New Governance
and Lex Informatica, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 94-95 (2016) (describing the "classic
example of uncompensated negative externalities" involving pollution).
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the disturbance to the neighbor, they may choose to make a
suboptimal level of noise by playing their music too loud.
Negative externalities provide the economic justification for
various types of regulation but are less commonly discussed as an
impediment to worker safety and health. 113 Often, employer-worker
relations do not affect anyone outside of the labor transaction. 1 14
However, this Note argues that in the case of the fashion industry,
models' public visibility creates a negative externality due to the
general public's internalization of the thin ideal.11 5
The market itself can solve negative externalities through
private negotiations if the costs of bargaining are low enough. 116
However, in cases where bargaining costs are high, some form of
outside intervention is typically justified.1 1 7
Bargaining power disparities in which an employer has the
upper hand may also lead to undesirable outcomes for workers.1 1 8
Scholars have characterized this issue from opposing perspectives 19
but generally seem to agree that at the very least, inequity in
bargaining power can lead to wages and working conditions that
society deems unacceptable from a values-based standpoint. 120 The
typical solution for bargaining power disparities is the formation of
unions, which allow workers to bargain collectively rather than
individually for a more equitable outcome. 12 1 Collective bargaining
increases the power that workers hold in the bargaining dynamic,
allowing them to demand, among other things, safer workplaces. 122
Finally, employers may choose to engage in workplace safety
collectively through industry self-regulation in the context of the labor
market. 123
However,
economic
rationality
suggests that
113.
See Lambert, supra note 91, at 1015-18; see also Stemler, supra note 112, at 127-28
(discussing the implications of negative externalities with respect to self-employed
"microentrepreneurs").

114.
115.

See Lambert, supra note 91, at 1016-17.
See infra Part IV.A.

116.

STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 83-84 (2004). See

generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
117.

SHAVELL, supra note 116, at 87, 92-94.

118.
See Schwab, supra note 110, at 139-42.
119.
Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor's Inequality of BargainingPower: Myth or Reality?, 12 J.
LAB. RES. 151, 153-54 (1991).
120.

GUY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW 52 (2016).

121.

Susan

Hayter,

Unions and

Collective Bargaining, in

LABOUR

MARKETS,

INSTITUTIONS AND INEQUALITY: BUILDING JUST SOCIETIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 95, 95 (Janine

Berg ed., 2015).
122.
See id.
123.
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 323 (2005).
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self-regulation is rarely effective without the threat of state-based
sanctions. 124 In the specific context of workplace health and safety,
factors that predict voluntary self-regulation include (i) low prevention
costs, (ii) high likelihood the firm will have to pay for damages, (iii)
pressure from consumers, (iv) high likelihood that workers will
demand a wage premium, and (v) clear and widespread social norms
that promote worker protection. 125 In other words, a successful
self-regulatory regime is highly unlikely to materialize absent some
outside incentives.
B. Workers' Compensation
Many states began adopting workers' compensation systems in
the early nineteenth century to provide compensation for work-related
injuries, 126 largely due to a perception that the labor market and the
common law afforded inadequate protections to workers. 127 All states
implemented some form of workers' compensation laws by 1949.128
These programs operate separately from the legal system 29 and act as
a strict liability mechanism by providing compensation for workers
130
who are injured on the job, regardless of employer negligence.
Compensation includes both a portion of lost wages during the period
that the individual is unable to work and costs of medical care due to
the injury. 131

Workers' compensation systems serve two purposes. First and
most obvious is the ex post function of compensating workers who
have suffered a harm in order to alleviate their loSS. 1 3 2 Second,
workers' compensation systems are thought to improve efficient safety
measures because they shift the cost of workplace injuries to
employers. 133 In the sense that employers must either pay out
workers' compensation claims or pay experience-rated premiums for

See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
124.
DEREGULATION DEBATE 19 (1992); see also Estlund, supra note 123, at 323.
Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory
125.
and Practice:The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 129-31 (2000).
LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND & THOMAS J. KNIESNER, RAND CORP., THE LAW AND
126.
ECONOMICS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION ix, x (1980).
127.

82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation §1 (2018).

DARLING-HAMMOND & KNIESNER, supra note 126, at x.
ISHITA SENGUPTA ET AL., NAT'L ACAD. OF Soc. INS., WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
129.
BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS, 2010, at 1-2 (2010).
128.

130.

See id.

131.
132.
133.

Id. at 3.
Workers' Compensation, supra note 127,
Id. § 14.

§§

10, 11.
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workers' compensation insurance, they have an incentive to invest in a
safer workplace in order to avoid such claims. 134
The construction and implementation of workers' compensation
vary from state to state. 135 Notably, workers' compensation benefits
are limited to employees in all states, but states vary in their
definition of the term "employee." 1 3 6 Both New York and California,
the two largest hubs of the fashion industry in the United States, use
a variation of the multifactor Darden test1 37 to differentiate between
employees and independent contractors. 138 In both states' multifactor
test, the worker's right to control the work determines a worker's
classification. 139
C. The Legal System
The legal system acts in a manner similar to workers'
compensation: it provides ex post compensation to workers who suffer
harm in the workplace while also incentivizing employers to invest in
workers' welfare. 140 The ability of laborers to bring claims against
their employers stems from a variety of statutes and common law.
Notably, the availability of workers' compensation often preempts the
ability of employees to bring claims against their employers for
physical harm. 14 1 Thus, legal claims of employees against their
employers are largely limited to those involving either nonphysical
harm or, on the opposite end of the spectrum, death. Causes of action

134.

See id.

135.

Workers' Compensation Law-State by State Comparison, NAT'L FED'N INDEP. BUS.

(June 7, 2017), https://www.nfib.com/content/legal-compliance/legal/workers-compensation-lawsstate-by-state-comparison-57 181/ [https://perma.cc/P5L9-XKD5].
136.
Workers' Compensation, supra note 127, § 117.
137.
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (holding that
the hiring party's right to control the work determines whether a hired party is an employee,
along with other relevant factors, including "the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party;
the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of
payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party" (quoting Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989))).
138.
See Lara v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 769, 772-73 (Ct. App.
2010); State Ins. Fund v. Circus Man Ice Cream Corp., 721 N.Y.S.2d 717, 719 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
139.
Lara, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772; State Ins. Fund, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
140.
William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety and Health in
the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives That Influence Employer
Decisions to Control OccupationalHazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9, 29 (1989).
141.
Id.
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specific to employer-employee relationships include Title VII of the
143
the
Civil Rights Act (Title VII),14 2 the Fair Labor Standards Act,
44
and the Family and
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,1
Medical Leave Act.1 45 Wrongful death, intentional torts, fraud, and
defamation provide more general causes of action.
Similar to workers' compensation, relief for many legal claims
is statutorily limited to employees; independent contractors cannot
bring claims under any of the above-listed specific employer-employee
causes of action.1 46 Thus, many forms of discrimination go unchecked
One such
in the workplace in cases of independent contractors.
example can be found in the fashion industry itself. Due to their
independent contractor status, models have not been able to bring
claims for sexual harassment despite the prevalence of such
harassment in the industry.147
The willingness of injured workers to bring a claim is just as
important as their actual ability to do so.1 4 8 In cases where employees
are unwilling or unable to bring claims against their employers,
employers will not be incentivized to avoid worker-harming behavior.
In some instances, the surrounding circumstances drastically
49
affect a worker's inclination to bring a lawsuit against her employer.1
One study examined an incident in which workers with a
well-grounded legal claim were unwilling to bring employment
discrimination suits against their employers.15 0 The study's authors
surveyed a group of casino workers about their willingness to bring
suit after a relevant development in appellate case law. The case,

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964)
142.
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (2012)).
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified
143.
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012)).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
144.
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012)).
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified
145.
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2012)).
146.

Coverage, U.S.

EQUAL

EMP.

OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

https://www.eeoc.gov/

employers/coverage.cfm [https://perma.cc/2CVA-VN9F] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) ("People who
are not employed by the employer, such as independent contractors, are not covered by the antidiscrimination laws."); see also Chelsea Fitzgerald, Note, When Tech Startups Outgrow the 1099
Model: Moving Firms out of the Kiddie Pool, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 629, 630-31 (2016)
(listing various employment rights that are provided for "employees" but not for independent
contractors).

See Friedman, supra note 107.
147.
Tracey E. George, Mitu Gulati & Ann C. McGinley, The New Old Legal Realism, 105
148.
Nw. U. L. REV. 689, 734 (2011).
149.
Id.
Id. at 696-723.
150.
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Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating Co., indicated in dicta that casino
cocktail waitresses could likely win a sex discrimination case against
their employers based on questionable employee dress codes. 15 1
However, the authors found that almost no casino workers were
willing to bring such a suit. 15 2 The authors hypothesized potential
reasons for this, such as
high wages (including tips) that casino industry workers make, the
information-sharing mechanisms of the casinos, the nature of the legal market, the
absence of a highly developed class action bar, the strength of the unions, the
possibly low level of education of the workforce, and the lack of a significant [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)] office. 1 5 3

D. OSHA Regulations
Congress created OSHA through the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act). 154 The OSH Act additionally created
the National Institution for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
which is tasked with performing the research necessary for OSHA
regulation. 15 5 OSHA describes its mission as "assur[ing] safe and
healthful working conditions for working men and women by setting
and enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach,
education and assistance." 156 The justification for OSHA regulation is
similar to that of other regulatory agencies: it intervenes to remedy a
perceived market failure, specifically the failure of the labor market,
legal system, and workers' compensation programs to adequately
protect laborers.1 57
OSHA expands the protection available to workers by creating
ex ante standards that employers must comply with. 15 8 Both workers'
compensation and the legal system act as ex post systems in which

151.
Id. at 701-03. Notably, Jespersen lost her case due to her failure to adduce sufficient
evidence of sex stereotyping. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc). However, the Ninth Circuit articulated for the first time that disparate
standards of grooming policies constituted sex discrimination. See id.
152.
George, Gulati & McGinley, supra note 148, at 715.
153.
Id. at 734.
154.
About OSHA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/
about.html [https://perma.cc/2TXT-E6S5] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018); see Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2012)).
155.
29 U.S.C. §§ 669-71 (2012).
156.
About OSHA, supra note 154.
157.
See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and ContemporaryRisks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 70
(1989).
Id.
158.
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workers who have been injured are compensated. 15 9 In contrast,
OSHA attempts to prevent injuries from happening in the first
instance by setting standards, 160 inspecting workplaces, 161 and issuing
penalties for noncompliant employers. 162
While OSHA possesses relatively broad authority pursuant to
the OSH Act, OSHA traditionally only promulgates rules pertaining to
employment relationships in industrial sectors. 163 While OSHA rarely
promulgates regulations applying to nonindustrial employers, 164
NIOSH investigates and provides reports on a number of workplace
safety issues in nonindustrial settings.165
Similar to workers' compensation and the legal system,
OSHA's authority is formally limited to regulations that apply to
employees. 166 However, the Supreme Court has yet to define the term
"employee" within the OSHA context, 167 and it is unclear what test
applies in an OSHA setting. 168 Thus, OSHA may be reluctant to pass.
a regulation in which employment status is uncertain.
Lack of resources also limits OSHA's effectiveness at protecting
workers. For instance, the ratio of OSHA inspectors to workers in the
United States is 1:59,000.169 Commentators note that noncompliance
159.

Id.

160.

See

OSHA

Law

&

Regulations, OCCUPATIONAL

&

SAFETY

HEALTH ADMIN.,

https://www.osha.gov/law-regs.html [https://perma.cclXE8P-38QB] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
161.

Enforcement,

OSHA

OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY

HEALTH

&

ADMIN.,'

https://www.osha.gov/dep/index.html [https://perma.cc/PVV6-Y8VN] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
162.

See

OSHA

Penalties,

OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY

HEALTH

&

ADMIN.,

https://www.osha.gov/penalties/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z5NS-WE6V] (last visited Mar. 12,
2018).
See OSHA Law & Regulations, supra note 160.
163.
See id.
164.
For example, NIOSH investigated the prevalence of eating disorders among horse
165.
jockeys. See Safety and Health in the Horse Racing Industry, NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/horsejockey/default.html fhttps://perma.cc/
P67U-ARUFI (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law
166.
for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 251, 260 (2006); see 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2012).
Stone, supranote 166, at 260-61.
167.
The OSHA rule addressing this question vaguely describes a multifactor test and
168.
cites Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 20 F.3d 938 (9th
Cir. 1994) as its source. See Occupational Injury and Illness Recording and Reporting
Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5916, 6038 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1904,
1952). However, the commission in Loomis Cabinet Co. applied an economic realities test while
stating that the plaintiff also would have succeeded under the Darden test, leaving the proper
test unclear. Loomis Cabinet Co., 20 F.3d at 941-42.
169.

Commonly

Used

Statistics,

OCCUPATIONAL

https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html
Mar. 14, 2018).

SAFETY

&

HEALTH

[https://perma.cc/7LWM-76UM]

ADMIN.,

(last visited
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is rampant with respect to OSHA regulations, largely due to low
inspection rates and insufficient penalties, which fail to punish
violations effectively given the rarity of inspections. 170
E. Innovative Lawmaking
When Congress or state legislatures determine that other
forms of worker protections are insufficient, they may choose to pass
legislation aimed at providing specific and novel worker protections.
Such intervention may take the form of federal legislation, state laws,
or city ordinances.
1. Federal Legislation
The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
(MSPA) 171 provides an example of federal regulation directly aimed at
protecting a specific class of workers. 1 7 2 In the 1960s, the US public
became aware of the deplorable working conditions of the nation's
migrant farm workers, largely through a CBS investigative report
titled "Harvest of Shame." 173
In response, Congress took action
through the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963,174 later
repealed and replaced by the MSPA.
While well intentioned, the
MSPA has proved largely ineffective.17 5
In contrast,
Congress indirectly
affected performanceenhancing steroid use in Major League Baseball (MLB). 176 Beginning
in the late 1980s, many MLB players began using steroids in order to

170.
See Estlund, supra note 123, at 360-61; Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 125, at
108-09.
171.
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96
Stat. 2583 (1983) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (2012)).
172.
See Donald B. Pedersen, The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 37 ARK. L. REV. 253, 253 (1984).
173.
Robert Holly, More Than Half-Century After "Harvest of Shame," Migrant
Farmworkers in the U.S. Still Face Deplorable Conditions, MIDWEST CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE

REPORTING (Nov. 7, 2016), http://investigatemidwest.org/2016/11/07/more-than-half-centuryafter-harvest-of-shame-migrant-farmworkers-in-the-u-s-still-face-deplorable-conditions/
[https://perma.ccA2B4-SGKG].
174.
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920
(1964), repealed by Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, § 523, 96 Stat. at
2600; see Pedersen, supra note 172, at 253.
175.
Matthew Webster, "Jobs Americans Won't Do"` Our Farming Heritage, Hazardous
Harvests, and a Legislative Fix, 29 LAW & INEQ. 249, 263 (2011); Holly, supra note 173.
176.
Dan Deluliis & David Deluliis, Under Mounting Pressure: A History of Media
Influence on Major League Baseball Steroid Policies, 4 J. SPORT ADMIN. & SUPERVISION 3, 10
(2012).
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enhance performance.1 7 7 Congress visited this issue several times,
taking actions such as banning specific substances altogether1 7 8 and
considering a bill that would have set minimum standards for
professional athletic steroid testing. 179 While Congress never passed a
law that specifically applies to professional athletes, the MLB now
implements fairly rigorous drug testing, and the MLB steroid
epidemic is commonly considered an era of the past.18 0
2. State Legislation and Local Ordinances
Compared with federal legislation, state legislation comes with
The "race to the bottom" theory
additional built-in limitations.
predicts that state-based protective measures are unlikely to prove
effective when strong interstate competition exists. 181 Applying the
theory to worker protections, if one state passes a particularly
restrictive law, employers will have an incentive to shift their business
to other states in order to avoid higher costs. Similar logic applies to
city ordinances. A city could potentially pass an ordinance requiring
strict worker protection. In most scenarios, this is unlikely to occur
due to fear that if worker protection costs are high enough, employers
will pursue business in other cities where they incur lower costs.
However, lack of competition makes this less of a concern in
industries where employers are limited to primarily operating in
specific cities or states, such as the US fashion industry, which is
182
largely confined to New York City and Los Angeles.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
This Part discusses the feasibility of implementing various
protections and remedies for fashion models. Mirroring the discussion
of available protections and remedies, this Part discusses five
The Steroids Era, ESPN (Dec. 5, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://www.espn.com/mlb/
177.
topics/_/page/the-steroids-era [https://perma.cc/C76Q-LXYG].
See Deluliis & Deluliis, supra note 176, at 5.
178.
Id. at 10.
179.
See The Steroids Era, supra note 177 ("[T]here is no defined start or end time to 'the
180.
steroids era,' though it is generally considered to have run from the late '80s through the late
2000s.").
See, e.g., Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental Regulation: A
181.
Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 Soc. Scl. Q. 174, 175-80 (2006); C.W., Racing to the
Bottom, ECONOMIST (Nov. 27, 2013), https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/11/
labour-standards [https://perma.cc/JQ53-Y7K4].
182.

See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 114TH CONG., THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT OF THE FASHION INDUSTRY 1 (Comm. Print 2016) (noting that over two-thirds of US
fashion designers are based in either Los Angeles or New York City).
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categories: the labor market, workers' compensation, the legal system,
OSHA regulation, and innovative lawmaking.
Given the numerous protections that the United States affords
its workers, it is somewhat surprising that models have fallen through
the cracks.
One explanation may be that eating disorders
traditionally fall under the umbrella of psychological disorders rather
than physical illnesses, 18 3 even though eating disorders manifest
many physical symptoms. 1 84 Despite all of the protections discussed
in this Part, the United States has generally been more reluctant to
compel protections or assistance to those with mental illness than to
those with physical illness.1 8 5
Perhaps the greatest impediment to providing better worker
protections is the fashion industry practice of classifying models as
independent contractors rather than employees. 186
Many worker
protections and other benefits available to employees are notoriously
unavailable to independent contractors.18 7 Below follows a discussion
of barriers that models' status as independent contractors places on
their ability to receive sufficient legal protection.188 Given the novel
nature of providing protection related to mental health and models'
current status as independent contractors, this Note suggests that
innovative lawmaking provides the most promising protection for
fashion models.

183.
See Am. PSYCHIATRIC Assoc., supra note 19, at 329. All of the National Institute of
Health's information on eating disorders is contained on the National Institute of Mental
Health's website, supporting the conclusion that eating disorders are primarily considered a
mental illness in the United States. See Eating Disorders, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/eating-disorders/index.shtml
[https://perma.cc/TS2ZHLDP] (last updated Feb. 2016).
184.
See Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., supra note 19, at 329; see also id. at 329-54 (listing
symptoms).
185.
Susan Brink, Mental Health Now Covered Under ACA, but Not for Everyone, U.S.
NEWS (Apr. 29, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/04/29/mentalhealth-now-covered-under-aca-but-not-for-everyone [https://perma.cc/D2FZ-TJY2]. For example,
the Affordable Care Act expanded mandatory healthcare insurance for many conditions but did
not expand mental healthcare coverage to equal coverage for physical ailments. Mental Health
Benefits: State Laws Mandating or Regulating, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 30, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-benefits-state-mandates.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8RSX-6S7K].
186.
Ellis & Hicken, supra note 105.
187.
See supra Part III.
188.
See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Labor Market: BargainingPower Disparity, Negative
Externalities, and Self-Regulatory Failure

.

.

Currently, the labor market fails to provide models with
health-related protections. Bargaining power disparity, exacerbated
by a lack of unionization among fashion models, and a lack of effective
self-regulation have created a situation in which models feel that
pressures to lose weight must be accommodated. 18 9 The negative
externalities associated with the thin ideal further suggest that
protection against weight-loss pressures needs to be either bargained
for or provided by the government.
One reason for this bargaining power disparity is the perceived
desirability of a career as a fashion model, leading to an imbalance in
model supply and employer demand.190 There are very few modeling
jobs available in the fashion industry but many aspiring models.1 91
The same imbalance exists throughout the entertainment industry.1 92
However, in contrast to fashion, the rest of the entertainment industry
is predominantly unionized.1 93 There is currently no union for fashion
models.1 94 Given the success of unions in other entertainment

See Anais V. Paccione, Note, On Trend: Continuing the Effort to Inspire Fashion
189.
Industry Reform and Protect Underage Fashion Models, 41 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 413, 433-36
(2017); Ellen Wallwork, 'Models Afraid to Speak Out About Pressure to Be Dangerously Skinny',
Says Model Petitioning for Law Change, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 22, 2015, 4:23 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/09/22/models-weight-law-petition-rosienelson n8174916.html [https://perma.cc/UV7V-A8UL].
190.

See ASHLEY MEARS, PRICING BEAUTY: THE MAKING OF A FASHION MODEL 2-3 (2011).

See id. at 4; Models, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ooh/sales/models.htm
191.
[https://perma.cc/R23Z-LJDQ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (stating that there are only 4,800
individuals employed as models across the United States in 2016).
See MEARS, supra note 190, at 4; Athletes and Sports Competitors, BUREAU LAB.
192.
STAT.,

https://www.bls.gov/ooh/entertainment-and-sports/athletes-and-sports-competitors.htm

[https://perma.cc/8V42-Y92Z] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (stating that there are only 11,800
individuals employed as athletes across the United States in 2016). Acting jobs are also
notoriously hard to get due to a supply and demand imbalance, as evidenced by the common
anecdote of the aspiring actor waiting tables. See Matt Newton, The 10 Best Survival Jobs for
Actors, BACKSTAGE (Dec. 29, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.backstage.com/advice-foractors/backstage-experts/10-best-survival-jobs-actors/ [https://perma.ccRN27-92L3].
See, e.g., About AFM, AM. FED'N MUSICIANS, http://www.afm.org/about/about-afm/
193.
[https://perma.cc/MWH6-XZ5L] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018); About the NFLPA, NFL PLAYERS
ASS'N, https://www.nflpa.com/about [https://perma.cc/DY28-6296] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018);
History,

MAJOR

LEAGUE

BASEBALL

PLAYERS

ASS'N,

https://www.mlbpa.org/history.aspx

[https://perma.ccWE3C-ZBWF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
See Paccione, supra note 189, at 433-34; Sara Ziff, Opinion, Why Models Need Labor
194.
Protections, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe0411-ziff-fashion-models-labor-rights-20160412-story.html [https://perma.cc/9QDD-KBYA] ("The
fashion industry is always ready to cast off last year's models just as easily it does clothes, and
unlike other performers in the U.S., models have no union protection.").
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sectors,19 5 model unionization could combat industry pressure to
achieve a dangerously low weight while also potentially alleviating
unfair wages and other discriminatory workplace concerns of fashion
models.
The negative externalities created by the fashion industry
mirror those created by both the MLB steroid epidemic and the use of
chewing tobacco among MLB players, given the prominent roles of
both models and MLB players in popular culture. 196 MLB players'
steroid and chewing tobacco use created a negative externality to the
extent that young baseball players' idolization of MLB athletes led to
concerns that these young players might emulate professional
athletes' unhealthy behaviors. 197
Evidence that extremely thin fashion models impact the
mental health of young women is much more extensive than the
evidence that steroid use among MLB players influenced young male
athletes, 198 yet action regarding eating disorders is incredibly limited
compared to the persistent congressional interventions directed at the
MLB steroid epidemic.1 9 9
Given the consensus that self-regulation is rarely effective
without outside intervention or monitoring, 200 it is reasonable to infer
that congressional action led to the MLB's adoption of a rigorous
antisteroid policy.
Beyond a lack of state action, effective
self-regulation is less likely in the fashion industry for another reason:
the fashion industry consists of many competitors, while the MLB
essentially functions as a monopoly. 20 1 The MLB does not have to
worry about losing players or consumers when it implements a

195.
See, e.g., Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts, CNN (May 25, 2017, 8:27 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/20 13/09/03/us/pro-sports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/RN8M-B75T];
Samit Sarkar, Voice Actors, Video Game Makers Reach
Agreement to End Strike, POLYGON (Sept. 25, 2017, 7:19 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2017/
9/25/16363872/video-game-voice-actors-strike-sag-aftra-agreement [https://perma.cc/CB3R-9J861.
196.
See Connor Williams, Note, Should the Government Flex Its Muscles and Regulate
Steroids in Baseball? Weaknesses in the Public Health Argument, 6 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
151. 154 (2009); Frank Pallone, Opinion, Past Time for MLB to Ban Smokeless Tobacco, USA
TODAY (Apr. 3, 2016, 8:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/04/03/past-timemlb-ban-smokeless-tobacco-column/82477512/ [https://perma.cc/AU9F-CWWA].
197.
See Williams, supra note 196, at 154.
198.
Many medical journals have published studies showing a causal link between
consuming thin-obsessed media and poor health outcomes. See supra Part I.B.2. To the Author's
knowledge, there are no published studies on the causal effect of professional steroid use on
adolescent steroid use.
199.
See Deluliis & Deluliis, supra note 176, at 4-5; supra Part II.
200.
See Estlund, supra note 123, at 325.
201.
Samuel G. Mann, Note, In Name Only: How Major League Baseball's Reliance on Its
Antitrust Exemption Is Hurting the Game, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 589 (2012).
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self-regulatory policy, as it is the monopoly power in US professional
baseball. 202 For example, when the MLB banned chewing tobacco, it
did not have to worry that players who objected to this policy would
leave to play in another professional league, as there is no comparable
one. 203 However, if a particular fashion designer or agency pledges to
implement a policy designed to protect models, it may worry that it
will lose consumers to its competitors.
The fashion industry experimented with the idea of selfregulation with the recent LVMH-Kering Charter, which committed
all brands of LVMH and Kering-two French luxury fashion
205
conglomerateS 204 -to banning size zero models from the runway.
206
Notably, however, LVMH and Kering are both French companies,
and they signed the charter after France implemented a law requiring
207
models to provide a doctor's note certifying a healthy body weight.
Thus, it is possible that this "self-regulation" is more of a public
relations effort than a bona fide intervention, as it is unlikely the
LMVH-Kering Chater will have much, if any, effect outside of France's
preexisting law.
While this Note ultimately suggests that implementing
statutory protections is the best way to pursue change in the fashion
industry, pressuring the industry to self-regulate could potentially be
just as effective.

202.
203.

See id.
R.J. Anderson, MLB Bans Smokeless Chewing Tobacco for New Players in New CBA,

CBS SPORTS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlb-bans-smokeless-chewing-

tobacco-for-new-players-in-new-cba/ [https://perma.cc/9PEL-XF45]; see Mann, supra note 201, at
589.
[https://perma.cc/TAP5See Brands, KERING, http://www.kering.com/enfbrands
204.
ADQ7] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018) (showing Kering owns brands such as Alexander McQueen
and Gucci); Fashion & Leather Goods, LVMH, https://www.lvmh.com/houses/fashion-leathergoods/ [https://perma.cc/JF64-82QC] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018) (showing LVMH owns highrecognition brands including Fendi, Christian Dior, and Marc Jacobs).
Scarlett Conlon, Kering and LVMH Join Forces on Model Wellbeing Charter, VOGUE
205.
http://www.vogue.co.uk/article/kering-balenciaga-model-wellbeing-charter
6,
2017),
(Sept.
[https://perma.cc/6327-UVHX].
See Dominique Vidalon, Fashion Giants LVMH and Kering Ban Size Zero Models,
206.
REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2017, 4:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lvmh-kering-models/
fashion-giants-lvmh-and-kering-ban-size-zero-models-idUSKCN1BH13Z [https://perma.cc/KW66-

XXUV].
207.

Id.
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B. The Legal System, Workers' Compensation, and OSHA Regulation:
An Issue of Employment Status
As mentioned above, the fashion industry widely classifies
models as independent contractors rather than employees, 208 a
classification that has yet to be successfully challenged. Thus, unless
courts move toward a consensus that models are misclassified as
independent contractors, many protections offered by the legal system,
workers' compensation, and OSHA are unavailable to models. 209
Tests for employment vary by context but typically consist of
some variation of the Darden factors. 2 10 The linchpin of the Darden
factors is the amount of control the employer exhibits over the
worker. 2 11 As mentioned above, both California and New York employ
a variation of the Darden factors in inquiries into employment status
for workers' compensation purposes. 212 There is a good argument that
the industry misclassifies models as independent contractors due to
the strict control that designers and photographers exhibit over
models' entire physical presence, including their clothing, posture,
facial expressions, makeup, and hair. 213 This leaves models with
essentially no control over their experience backstage, on the runway,
or in front of a camera. Despite the possibility that a court could
determine models are misclassified as independent contractors, the
looming uncertainty may be enough to deter models from bringing
legal claims or attempting to collect workers' compensation and to
prevent OSHA from promulgating regulations.
Beyond uncertainty surrounding employment classification,
legal claims and OSHA regulation face additional specific barriers to
success. In order to successfully implement change through the legal
system, a model would need to identify a cause of action and be willing
to bring a claim, all amid uncertainty that her classification as an
independent contractor will not bar her claim.

208.
See Ellis & Hicken, supra note 105.
209.
See supra Parts III.B-D.
210.
See Frequently Asked Questions: Employer-Employee Relationship, U.S. DEP'T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/faqs/EmpRelationship.html
[https://perma.cc/69PVWQTH] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).

&

211.
See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, 915.003, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2-III
(2000), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1 [https://perma.cc/75RT-C9ES];
see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 (2003) ("We are
persuaded by the EEOC's focus on the common-law touchstone of control.").
212.
See supra Part III.B.
213.
See Alexandra R. Simmerson, Note, Not So Glamorous: Unveiling the
Misrepresentationof FashionModels'Rights as Workers in New York City, 22 CARDOZO J. INT'L
COMP. L. 153, 179-80 (2013).
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The most likely causes of action for effecting change in this
area include Title VII sex discrimination and wrongful death claims.
A model could possibly bring a Title VII claim under the argument
that the standards required by agencies and designers cause physical
and mental harm to female models but not male models. 2 1 4 While
male models are also subject to appearance pressures, they typically
are not expected to achieve dangerously low body weights but instead
are expected to be lean and muscular. 2 1 5
With respect to the legal system, it is entirely possible that
even if models were considered employees and could bring claims
against designers or their agencies, they may be unwilling to do so.
Many of the situational issues that the casino worker study identified
also exist among fashion models, making it questionable that a
fashion model would be willing to bring a lawsuit. 2 16 One of the most

significant factors the study pinpointed as leading to an unwillingness
to bring suits was high wages among casino workers. 2 17 However, this
factor does not necessarily turn on high wages alone-high wages act
as a proxy for the desirability of a job. 2 18 While the majority of models
may not make particularly high wages, their jobs are seen as
9
desirable, leading to a low likelihood of bringing a claim. 2 1
A claim for wrongful death would not run up against these
same barriers. However, it seems unwise to wait for another death in
Further, many
the industry to begin promoting change.
anorexia-related deaths are ultimately ruled suicides, 2 2 0 likely
negating liability. 22 1
The likelihood of successful OSHA regulation is limited on two
fronts. First, OSHA is stretched thin-limited by its resources and
criticized for the rates of noncompliance with its regulations. 2 2 2
Cf. Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 604-05 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
214.
(holding that Continental Airlines' strict weight requirements for a position held only by women
constituted Title VII sex discrimination).
Tim Olds, Here's What the 'Ideal'Bodyfor Men and Women Looks Like, Bus. INSIDER
215.
(Dec. 31, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/heres-what-the-ideal-body-for[https://perma.cc/J7BT-5BQU].
men-and-women-looks-like-2016-2#I0OC87JZibi3kzYA.99
However, this claim may be undermined to the extent that male models use steroids to obtain a
particular body shape. See id.
See George, Gulati & McGinley, supra note 148, at 734.
216.
Id.
217.
See George, Gulati & McGinley, supra note 148, at 720 ("These women had jobs that
218.
get; they were not going to upset the apple cart.").
hard
to
were
See MEARS, supra note 190, at 20.
219.
See Sullivan, supra note 33, at 1073-74.
220.
See, e.g., 66 CAL. JUR. 3D Wrongful Death § 21 (2018); 37 N.Y. JUR. 2D Death § 307
221.
(2018).
See Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supranote 125, at 108.
222.
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Second, while OSHA has the statutory authority to regulate the type
of harm that models suffer, it rarely promulgates regulations outside
of the industrial sector. 22 3 Thus, it is unlikely that OSHA would
invest in developing a questionable regulatory structure-due to the
uncertainty of models' employment status-that is also removed from
the agency's traditional regulatory focus.
C. Innovative Legislation
City governments, state legislatures, or Congress can-and
should-sidestep all the above-mentioned barriers faced by fashion
models in obtaining workplace protections by passing a version of
Israel's or France's recent laws. This legislation may serve not only to
protect models through formal sanctions but also to effectuate a
change in broader social norms. Even short of passing a new law,
serious discussion about such regulations may help prompt industry
self-regulation. 224
1. State Legislation and Local Ordinances
State-based legislation could be an effective means of
protecting fashion models if both California and New York were to
adopt similar protections for fashion models. Concerns regarding loss
of business due to state-based legislation are relatively limited in the
US fashion industry because of its high concentration in Los Angeles
and New York City. 2 2 5

California Assembly Member Marc Levine introduced a bill in
February 2016 that attempted to provide protections to fashion
models. 226 The proposed bill stated that models would be considered
employees of those who directly used their services, which essentially
translated to fashion designers and photographers. 2 2 7 It further
tasked the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards
Board with establishing a standard that would protect fashion models
223.
224.

See OSHA Law & Regulations, supra note 160.
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Paulson, Regulation Through Intimidation: Congressional

Hearings and Political Pressureon America's Entertainment Media, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC.

61, 61 (2004) (describing the effects of congressional pressure on self-regulation in the
entertainment industry); cf. Reut Snir, Trends in Global Nanotechnology Regulation: The PublicPrivate Interplay, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 107, 115-16 (2014) (noting in the environmental
context that "businesses are motivated to [self-regulate] before government sets potentially
inflexible rules" even in the absence of direct pressure).
225.
See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 182, at 1 (noting that
over two-thirds of US fashion designers are employed in either Los Angeles or New York City).
226.
Assemb. B. 2539, 2015-16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
227.
Id. § 1.
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from pressures to achieve unhealthily low bodyweights. 228 Despite
229
In a
Levine's efforts, this bill died in the appropriations committee.
similar vein, the New York state legislature briefly considered a law in
2013 that explicitly defined a narrow category of models who would be
considered independent contractors. 230 This bill died in the assembly
committee. 231
While it is unclear why the New York and California bills did
not ultimately pass, one likely reason is lobbying from fashion
agencies and designers. Both bills attempted to drastically narrow the
232
class of models who could be considered independent contractors,
which would have yielded drastic financial consequences for fashion
agencies and designers. 233 A hypothetical bill that does not attempt to
classify fashion models as employees may face less opposition than
those that died in the California and New York legislatures.
Moreover, it is possible to craft a bill that protects models'
health without classifying them as employees. In October 2017, New
York State Assemblywoman Nily Rozic announced her intent to
introduce an amendment to New York's antidiscrimination law that
would close a loophole making it impossible for models to bring workrelated sexual harassment claims due to their status as independent
contractors. 234 This proposal does not attempt to classify models as
employees for all purposes but rather simply proposes to afford
protections in the realm of workplace discrimination and sexual
harassment. 235 A weight-based law could benefit from this strategy of
a narrow focus rather than attempting to reclassify model
employment status in a single sweep. Perhaps this specific New York
bill proposal could even include protection against weight-based
discrimination.
2. Federal Legislation

local

Federal legislation provides a viable alternative to state or
lawmaking.
However, one counterargument to creating

228.
See id.
229.
California AB
2539,
HARV.
T.H.
CHAN
SCH.
PUB.
HEALTH,
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/striped/policy-translation/california-ab-2539/
[https://perma.cc/E5S3-8YBN] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
See Assemb. B. 5263, §§ 2, 4, 6, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
230.
Assembly Bill A5263, N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/
231.
bills/2013/a5263/amendment/original [https://perma.cc/TEA2-BQB5] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
See Assemb. B. 2539, § 1; Assemb. B. 5263, §§ 2, 4, 6.
232.
See Sodomsky, supra note 104, at 289.
233.
See Friedman, supra note 107.
234.
Id.
235.
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legislation to protect fashion models is the possibility that such
legislation may prove ineffective and costly. Such an argument is
potentially supported by the failure of the MSPA to materially
improve conditions for migrant agricultural workers. 236
Notably,
however, important differences exist between migrant agricultural
workers and fashion models, specifically the number of laborers
affected by the MSPA as compared to legislation directed at fashion
models. There are an estimated 4,800 fashion models working in the
United States currently. 2 37 While estimates of the number of migrant
farmworkers are sparse, one 1993 study estimated that there were
more than three million migrant farmworkers in the United States at
the time. 238 Despite uncertainty in this number, it is safe to say that
the number of migrant farmworkers inordinately exceeds the 4,800
US fashion models. Thus, the monetary resources needed to enforce a
law pertaining to fashion models would fall magnitudes below the
level of resources needed to enforce the MSPA. Further, problems
with specific inspection mechanisms and exemptions in the MSPA
caused problems and could be addressed with careful legislative
drafting. 2 39
With respect to the MLB, Congress successfully effectuated
industry self-regulation by placing pressure on the league. 240
Congress could take similar action in the fashion industry without
actually passing a law directly protecting fashion models.
3. Characteristics of Innovative Laws
One can imagine two categories of potential laws that protect
models. The first involves providing ex ante protections similar to
OSHA regulations, which would provide enforcement mechanisms
independent of the legal system. This system would penalize industry
actors for perpetuating demand for unhealthily thin fashion models
and would not require any specific legal action on the part of fashion
models. The second type would provide ex post legal remedies to
fashion models who experience pressure to achieve extreme thinness
or retaliation for refusing to do so.

236.
237.

See Webster, supra note 175, at 263; Holly, supra note 173.
Models, supra note 191.

238.
See NAT'L CTR. FOR FARMWORKER HEALTH, FARMWORKER HEALTH FACT SHEET
(2012) (citing ALICE LARSON & LUIs PLASCENCIA, OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, MIGRANT

ENUMERATION
STUDY
(1993)),
http://www.ncfh.org/uploads/3/8/6/8/38685499/fsmigrant demographics.pdf [https://perma.ccWR28-C3RX].
239.
See Webster, supra note 175, at 263, 270-75; Holly, supra note 173.
240.
See supra Part III.E.1.
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Israel's and France's laws both model ex ante solutions. 24 1
There, the enforcement mechanism is the requirement that models
obtain a certificate of health, with agencies subjected to fines if they
employ a model without such a certificate. 242 In this sense, the
requirement acts similarly to a licensing mechanism. 243 Industry
actors working with local governments in Milan and Madrid
implemented similar measures, prohibiting unhealthily thin models
from walking in their iconic fashion weeks. 244
In contrast, an ex post solution would likely mimic employment
discrimination laws. Here, if a model could prove that her employer
pressured her to sacrifice her health to lose weight or discriminated
against her for refusing to do so, she could recover damages in a
lawsuit. Given the above discussion about willingness to bring legal
claims, the ex ante solution pursued by the Israeli and French
governments and Milan and Madrid industry actors makes more sense
than implementing an ex post solution. 245
France's law requires models to obtain a certificate of health
every two years. 246 However, models' health and weight can fluctuate
drastically in that time period. 247 In order to be effective, a health
certificate system would need to require more frequent certification or
a different design. Perhaps the most cost-effective design would
require fashion models to obtain a certificate of health before walking
in NYFW or major fashion shows generally. A more expansive design
could require fashion models to obtain a health certificate every six
months, providing protection for more than just runway models and
sending a stronger signal.
Other important considerations building off a basic ex ante
structure include setting a standard with which agencies or models
must comply, determining which industry player to hold accountable,
choosing a method of policing, and constructing an efficient penalty
scheme.
Other countries use either a BMI-exclusive standard or a
standard that requires a certification of overall health. 248 While a
BMI-exclusive standard would be easier to police and would provide a
241.
See supra Part II.
242.
See supra Part II.
See Ryan Nunn, Occupational Licensing and American Workers, BROOKINGS (June
243.
21, 2016) https://www.brookings.edu/research/occupational-licensing-and-the-american-worker/
[https://perma.cc/828V-AYSQ].
See supra Part II.
244.
See supra Parts II, IV.B.
245.
246.
See Friedman, supra note 83.
See generally supra note 36 and accompanying text.
247.
248.
See supra Part II.
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bright-line rule, a standard assessing overall health could be more
successful at differentiating between those who actually engage in
UWCBs and those who are naturally extremely thin. A BMI standard
would provide more benefits on the negative externality side of the
thin ideal, as it would move the public spotlight away from all
excessively thin models. In contrast, an overall health standard might
be considered less discriminatory-as well as less prone to First
Amendment criticismS 2 4 9-as
it would not penalize those with a
naturally low BMI. Also entering the equation is the fact that a
health professional must perform an overall health evaluation, while a
BMI evaluation could be performed by anyone proficient in using a
scale and tape measure. 250 Notably, the models surveyed in the
Rodgers et al. study expressed the belief that an overall health
standard would have a larger positive impact and prove more feasible
than a BMI standard. 251 One alternative to an overall health
standard would be to set a minimum BMI so low that no one could be
considered healthy who had such a BMI.
Lawmakers would likely want to target modeling agencies as
the accountable industry actor. Agencies have long-term relationships
with the models they represent, while designers' and clients'
relationships with models are transitory in nature. 252
Further,
designers and clients typically only interact with the model indirectly
through the agency. 253 While a designer may indirectly contribute to
weight-based pressures by requesting models of a certain size, 254 the
modeling agency acts as the perpetrator when it comes to pressuring
an individual model to lose weight. 255
Lastly, lawmakers need to consider methods of enforcement.
Lawmakers should not ignore the possibility of fraud, especially if
utilizing a potentially subjective standard that assesses overall health,
and should task a neutral party with enforcing the legislation. With
respect to penalties imposed on violators, lawmakers should follow
general principles of economics and ensure that the likelihood of being
caught violating the law multiplied by the expected penalty outweighs

249.
See infra Part IV.C.4.
250.
See
Calculate
Your
Body
Mass
Index,
NAT'L
INST.
HEALTH,
https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/educational/lose-wt/BMI/bmicalc.htm
[https://perma.cc/XE3TKZRD] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
251.
See Rodgers et al., supra note 40, at 290.
252.
See Sodomsky, supra note 104, at 290.
253.
See Kit Johnson, Importing the Flawless Girl, 12 NEV. L.J. 831, 837 (2012).
254.
Id.
255.
See, e.g., Rodgers et al., supra note 40, at 284; Elan, supra note 12.
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the benefit from violating the law. 2 5 6 Finally, lawmakers may also
want to consider creating an EEOC- or OSHA-style complaint line
through which models could anonymously report agencies pressuring
engagement in UWCBs. 2 57 This would allow for more targeted
investigations into industry law violators. Economies of scale suggest
that the best solution may be for Congress to create a small
enforcement agency-perhaps as a branch of the EEOC-to
investigate, report, and assess penalties related to this legislation.
4. First Amendment Considerations
Fashion is widely considered an art, and thus many of the
decisions that factor in to the ultimate presentation of a model on the
runway or in a photograph would likely be considered artistic
expressions for First Amendment purposes.

258

Some may argue that

the legislation proposed above would violate the First Amendment
rights of designers, photographers, or even fashion models themselves
via the doctrine of prior restraint. 259 A court analyzing this claim
would apply either strict scrutiny or the more relaxed Central Hudson
test, depending on whether fashion is considered public discourse or
commercial speech. 260
In the vast majority of cases, there would be only a weak
argument that this legislation would restrict the First Amendment
rights of fashion models, as they exhibit little to no control over the
artistic expressions presented during the course of their work. 26 1
However, in the rare context in which a model is sufficiently renowned
in the industry and controls her own work, she may have a claim that
256.

See A.

Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public

Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 68 (2000).
See Filing a Formal Complaint, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
257.

COMMISSION,

[https://perma.cc/2ACN-NKLA]
https://www.eeoc.gov/federallfed-employees/filing-complaint.cfm
(last visited Mar. 16, 2018); How to File a Safety and Health Complaint, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ADMIN.,

https://www.osha.gov/workers/file-complaint.html

[https://perma.cclV6RV-

WL8F] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
See Vanessa Padula, Whitewashed Runways: Employment Discrimination in the
258.
Fashion Modeling Industry, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 117, 130-31 (2016); see also
First

Amendment:

Freedom

of

Speech

Prior

Restraint,

CONST.

L.

REP.,

https://constitutionallawreporter.com/amendment-01/prior-restraint/#Licensing
[https://perma.cc/SZM9-8Y5K] (discussing concerns with licensing regimes as they relate to prior
restraint); cf. Lili Levi, The New Separability, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 709, 773-74 (2018)
(noting that fashionable clothing might be protected as an artistic feature embodied in a useful
work by the policies underlying the US Copyright Act).
See generally Prior Restraint, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
259.
wex/prior restraint [https://perma.cc/9HVH-W4G5] (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501-03 (1996).
260.
261.
See supra Part IV.B.

1256

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:4:1219

such legislation would restrict her right to express herself. But such
legislation could likely survive even strict scrutiny in this context, 262
which requires the regulation to be narrowly tailored to a compelling
government interest. Here, the compelling government interest is the
ability to protect fashion models from severe health risks. It is
narrowly tailored, moreover, in the sense that the licensing system is
meant to solely prohibit models who are suffering from UWCBs, either
by setting a BMI so low that it could not be considered healthy under
any circumstance or by requiring a certification of overall health based
on objective measures.
The claim that the proposed legislation infringes upon
designers' or photographers' free speech rights is even weaker. These
claims would likely be analyzed in a manner similar to a recent
Massachusetts case evaluating the First Amendment's protection of
speech that encourages or assists suicide. 263 In Commonwealth v.
Carter, the court held that speech having a direct, causal link to a
victim's suicide is not protected by the First Amendment. 2 6 4
Expressions of fashion involving incredibly thin models in
photographs and on the runway almost certainly qualify as having a
"direct, causal effect" on models' negative health outcomes.
Admittedly, eating disorders are not always life threatening in the
same way that suicide attempts are, but similar logic would apply and
likely lead to such legislation surviving even a strict scrutiny test.
5. The Expressive Value of Law
One final benefit of pursuing innovative legislation is found in
the "expressive function of law." 2 6 5 A law may act as a signal of social
values, which can lead to modifications of individual preferences and
social norms. 266 Beyond limiting the ability of agencies to pressure
models into UWCBs, creating a law expressing an attempt to do so
could directly reduce the thin ideal by changing social norms. Such a
law would send a signal to the public that society deems the thin ideal
undesirable, thus potentially reducing internalization of the thin

ideal.

262.
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226-27 (2015).
263.
Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1064 n.17 (Mass. 2016).
264.
Id.
265.
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024
(1996); see Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 607 (1998).
266.
Id. at 586.
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V. CONCLUSION

While there is no way to immediately eliminate the thin ideal,
the United States lags far behind the rest of the world with respect to
progressing toward improvement. As predicted by self-regulation
theorists, government attention and pressure spurred progress toward
protecting models from body-weight pressures in other countries.
Until someone-whether it be government actors, unionized models,
or consumers-gives the US fashion industry an incentive to improve,
it will continue perpetuating the thin ideal to the detriment of fashion
models and the public at large.
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